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The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement substituted the full-scale war with a "mini
cold-war", that is to say, a truce supervised by the USA and the European Union.
Real preconditions for a normalization of the region came only after the defeat of
nationalist-authoritarian political forces, both in Croatia, in January 2000 and in Yugoslavia
(namely Serbia) in October 2000. In November 2000 the Zagreb Summit of the EU was held,
opening the real process of normalization. Despite the fact that the Dayton Agreement
established the precondition for a gradual return to normalcy and peace, it succeeded only
partially. It is obvious that the concept of security implied in this process cannot be a narrowly
reduced concept of security as the absence of threats and risks. A new approach should be
elaborated, taking into account the most advanced approach of "human security". That
concept should be worked out as a "cooperative security approach" by centering on human
security issues, such as the circulation of men, ideas and values - and not only in the security
sector, but in all fields of regional cooperation.
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1. Introduction
The last decade marked the region of South-
East Europe as a "conflict-generator". The signing
of the Dayton Peace Agreement substituted the full-
scale war (albeit a low intensity conflict with a large
number of civilian casualties) with a "mini cold-war",
that is to say a truce supervised by the USA and the
European Union. Real preconditions for a normali-
zation of the region came only after the defeat of
nationalist-authoritarian political forces, both in
Croatia, in January 2000 and in Yugoslavia (namely
Serbia) in October 2000. In November 2000 the
Zagreb Summit of the EU was held, opening the real
process of normalization.
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Normalization meant also growing security in
the region (better to say: the decrease of insecurity).
This normalization, however, occurred exclusively
under the pressure and guidance from abroad, i.e.
from the international community (USA, ED, OSCE,
UN and intertwined regional oriented initiatives).
Even after the demise of the nationalist-authoritar-
ian forces in Croatia and Serbia, mutual suspicion
and insecurity remained. In both key-countries of the
region of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia and Serbia,
weak political coalitions came in power, burdened
with a lack of political culture, a lack of energetic
reform-minded politicalleaderships, and almost cata-
strophic economic situation as inherited from the pre-
vious regimes. Despite the victory of democratic
forces, nationalism was not defeated, as it may have
appeared. During the last decade nationalism spread
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as a virus, owing to the escalation of the conflict and
the cruelties of war, which far exceeded the worse
predictions.
Despite the fact that the Dayton Agreement
established the precondition for a gradual return to
normalcy and peace, it succeeded only partially. The
Dayton Agreement was envisaged as a long-term and
continuous process with three phases: first, frame-
works would be established for strengthening meas-
ures for building security and trust in the area of
Bosnia and Herzegovina; secondly, to determine the
restrictions in the field of armament control for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia;
and thirdly, to finally analyse armament control meas-
ures that should include all states in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia and the neighbouring states.
To a certain extent, this process gave some tangible
results.
However, the confidence-building process af-
ter Dayton began slowly, due to the fact that two
aspects of the peace process were sabotaged by the
nationalist governments both in Croatia and Yugo-
slavia: the first is the return of refugees; the second
is the prosecution of war criminals and perpetrators
of heavy human rights violations. The "healing" of
the societies could begin only after the elimination
of the political elites that led the nations during the
war. The conflict in the forrner Yugoslavia was a
model of overlapping wars, thus rendering more dif-
ficult the analysis of the root and causes of the war,
and, of course, to heal the wounds in the after-war
period. The first cause of the wares) in the former
Yugoslavia was the fight for power within the Yugo-
slav federation, where Siobodan Milosevic, as the
exponent of the former communist bureaucracy re-
sisting reforms used and manipulated the ideology
of Serbian nationalism to invert the shaky balance
upon which the Yugoslav federation was built, thus
launching an aggressive political campaign that re-
sulted in creating insecurity and the perception of
threats among other nations that constituted the Yu-
goslav Federation. Serbian nationalism ignited and
provoked other nationalisms and the spiral of vio-
lence began. The second aspect, or phase of the war
was the push to independence by other nations:
Milosevic's aggression, using the Serb minorities in
Croatia and the Serb people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina for the purpose of the aggrandizement
of Serbia provoked a similar reaction within the na-
tionalist elites that emerged after the first free elec-
tion in 1990: "hidden agendas" of a Greater Croatia
and of a Muslim ethnic Bosnia complicated the situ-
ation. Atrocities committed against the civilian popu-
lation by Milosevic and the Yugoslav People's Army
(JNA) under his control triggered a violent reaction
and over-stepping on the right of self-defence, lead-
ing to abuses and war crimes committed against Serb
civilians as a revenge or retaliation, as well as against
political adversaries who did not share nationalists
views and policies. Thus the war, initially starting
first with violence of an armed insurgence (the first
casualties in April 1991, were a Serb civilian in
Croatia and a Croatian policeman), then turned to a
military conflict against Slovenia and then against
Croatian civilians and settlements in Croatia, taking
the form of an aggression after the declaration of
independence both of Slovenia and Croatia (June
1991), eventually turned into a series of civil wars,
in which the nationalist elites in all three countries
cleansed its own nation-state from political adver-
saries. Democracy that was proclaimed after the fall
of communism was in fact only a facade, and de-
spite the fact that communists were defeated, com-
munists' authoritarian political practice remained as
a form of political culture, where the collective was
labelled as the supreme value of the nation, whereas
the individual is subjugated to the fate of the collec-
tive. During communism the collectivist mind had
referred to the "society", now it referred to the "eth-
nic nation". The other aspects of the war were the
religious conflict, materialized through the form of
a "clash of civilizations" between the "Catholic civi-
lization" and the "Orthodox (Christian) civilization"
on one side, and on the other side between the "Chris-
tian civilization" and the "Islamic civilization".
Samuel Huntington's book became the official Bi-
ble of the Croatian nationalist leaders.
Until nationalists stayed in power i.e. until the
year 2000, both the preconditions of healing the
wounds created by the war were not possible: first,
the Croatian government simulated a return of the
Serb refugees, as well as it did not observe its com-
mitment to punish the perpetrators of war crimes and
human rights violations during the war from its own
"ethnic" ranks. The cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal in The Hague was tepid,
and only after foreign pressures the Government (i.e.
the President himself) yielded and eventually extra-
dited the indicted, from time to time. Yet all of those
accused of war crimes and transferred to The Hague
were treated almost as national heroes. The new gov-
ernment promised a full cooperation and, as a result,
the international community rewarded the declara-
tory commitments of the new government involving
Croatia in almost all international fora, such as the
NATO Partnership of Peace, the EU (lately with the
Association and Stabilization process), the WTO, the
CEFTA (upon suggestion from the EU), etc.
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Normalization with neighbouring countries
went very slow, despite the expectance after the vic-
tory of the democratic coalition in 2000. As of to-
day, Croatia has not solved the border problem with
two of its former-Yugoslav neighbours: Slovenia,
with which a conflict over the Piran bay outburst in
summer 2002 taking the form of border incidents and
provocations from both sides; and Yugoslavia, re-
sulting in strong feelings about the Prevlaka isthmus
and border incidents on the Danube river. The third
former Yugoslav state, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
signed in 2001 a border agreement with Croatia, rati-
fied in both the parliaments, but lately Croatia de-
spite the fact that ratification was done, wants to re-
negotiate the terms about the joint administration of
the port of Ploce.
The normalization with Bosnia and
Herzegovina marked a positive turning point when
Croatia decided, one year after the democratic
change, to cancel financing the Croatian component
of the Bosnian Army and giving money for the local
public administration in Herzegovina to local Croats,
who have maintained strong nationalist attitudes and
want to establish the third federal unit in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (besides the "Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina" and the "Republic Srpska") based on
the ethnic principle, thus destabilizing the already
shaken situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lately
the High Representative banned nationalists from the
elections, stormed the Herzegovina bank through
which illegal funding was provided, but their strong-
holds still remain intact.
Normalization is the first precondition for se-
curity and cooperation: normal diplomatic relations
were established after the democratic changes in
2000, but the process of normalization is very slow.
The Croatian government still is very slow in allow-
ing the repatriation of Serb refugees, creating a lot
offormal obstacles to the returnees. For this reason,
many refugees rather wish to stay in Yugoslavia, than
to go back and to face an uncertain future. Single
cases were reported that returnees have been beaten,
killed or ostracized by the communities they returned
in. Besides, most of them do not find jobs and are
left to live by their own devices. The integration of
returnees still suffers from ethnic prejudices, harass-
ments and in many cases returnees were brought to
courts for alleged wrongdoings during the war de-
spite the general amnesty applied to all those who
participated in the war. One of the existing problems
is still the insisting of the EU and OSCE that Croatia
recognizes the tenants rights to the returnees, either
to reinstate them in these rights or to find a form of
just compensation (Croatian authorities claims that
"tenants' rights" were abolished in 1992 and there-
fore refugees cannot get back what was cancelled).
One of the main obstacles for the normaliza-
tion between Croatia and Yugoslavia is still the visa
regime. The Yugoslav authorities even proposed that
visas be abolished between the two countries, but
Croatian authorities still apply a rigid visa system,
thus not allowing Yugoslav citizens to enter the coun-
try for other purposes other than strictly business.
Paradoxical cases are reported of Yugoslav business-
men who ask for transit visas to go to Slovenia by
train, and Croatian authorities giving them only one
transit visa, whereas they are not allowed to return
through the Croatian territory.
Therefore to speak about extending security
cooperation in the European "Bermuda triangle" (Yu-
goslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia) means, in
the first place, to transcend the traditional approach
of security and security guarantees. Here, in the first
place, we must look at what "security" means for the
Croatian policy-makers and how they conceive it.
2. The security environment
and challenges
The Croatian Parliament adopted on March
19 a document entitled "The Strategy of National
Security of the Republic of Croatia". These docu-
ments pretend to formulate the "unified basis for the
creation and execution of institutional solutions, as
well as action measures in reacting to general secu-
rity threats and concrete forms of threat challenges
and concrete forms of threats posed to the Republic
of Croatia". The conceptual solutions formulated in
this document are the reflection offour factors: first,
the geopolitical position of the Republic of Croatia,
marked by a "decisive aspiration" to come closer and
to enter Euro-Atlantic and European security organi-
zations; second, the situation in the field of security
threats and risks for the Republic of Croatia; third,
the situation of the system and success in the imple-
mentation of the function of national security; and
fourth, the resources available.
This document offers a working definition of
national security. Thus, national security is defined
as follows: it is, first, a determined (achieved or pro-
jected) situation of security; second, national secu-
rity is a functional area of activity of different secu-
rity institutions, altogether with the comprehensive
social endeavours in the field of achievement of se-
curity goals; national security consists of those se-
curity institutions themselves, connected among
themselves in an ordered system of relations.
Although "security" is an ambiguous and elas-
tic concept in its meaning, and surely it cannot be
reduced only to its most fundamental sense, i.e. se-
f
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curity as the state of feeling free (awareness of ab-
sence) from threats, anxiety or danger, this "work-
ing definition" seems to be pretentious. It obfuscates
the understanding of the perception of threats im-
plicit in possible wars and near violent conflict situ-
ations that raise acute security questions for politi-
cal leadership, as well as the formulation of suitable
strategies of balancing, ally seeking and coalition-
building, defence spending and armed forces devel-
opment.
But let us see how, furthermore, the security
environment and challenges for the Republic of
Croatia is defined. First, Croatia is perceived as em-
bodying the new reality of international relations,
characterized by two controversial processes: one is
globalisation as the process of integration of differ-
ent "management systems and cultures in one en-
tirety", which leads, apparently, to the unification of
value systems, legal orders and technologies. The
second is the process of strengthening individual
identities of any kind - national (i.e. ethnic), regional,
cultural, religious, etc.). Croatia wants, allegedly, to
partake actively in shaping such a new reality, in
conformity with its possibilities and interests. A posi-
tive note is introduced by the explicit statement, that
in such circumstances the principle of undivided se-
curity appear more evident, and that this means that
there is no strengthening of our own security at the
expense of the security of others. At the same time,
there is no "effective facing with the risks and threats
without mutual cooperation and support - new chal-
lenges request new solutions".
However, the security environment is defined
as conditioned by factors that influenced predomi-
nantly its present position. Croatia is defined as a
state and society in transition towards a democratic
social order and market economy that was in the first
phase of its existence marked by an "armed aggres-
sion aiming at making impossible the achievement
of Croatian independence". The biggest part of eco-
nomic difficulties as well as security risks is caused
by the above mentioned. Here the fact that a preda-
tory privatisation took place during the last ten years,
through which a new class of "nouveau riches", i.e.
a new elite took hold on power and the national
wealth is clearly omitted.
The instability of "part of its encirclement",
being at the very beginning of a social-economic tran-
sition, represents a "security threat for the Republic
of Croatia", albeit this instability does not represent
any more a direct security threat, as formulated in
the document.
Another paragraph of the National Security
Strategy deals with the fact, that in neighbouring
Bosnia and Herzegovina the central state adminis-
tration is not yet functioning, and that the position
of the Croatian people is sensitive because of the
very fact of their scarcity. The evident imbalance
between the "entities" is also mentioned.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that was
in the past ten years the main generator of regional
instability, after the parliamentary and presidential
elections in October 2000 does not represent a threat
any more, but a potential partner. Bilateral relations
have been normalized and are expected to develop
through various forms of bilateral and regional co-
operation. The evolution of the whole area of South-
East Europe into a zone of partnership, stability and
economic progress will request a more active par-
ticipation of the Republic of Croatia. This is clear a
progress - in perceiving Yugoslavia as a potential
partner and gives hope that impulses for regional sta-
bility and security arrangements can generate from
within the region, some day.
On the other hand, Croatian environment con-
sists also of stable and consolidated democracies.
Hungary e.g. has been a member of NATO since
1999, which represents a considerable contribution
to regional stability. Others are in the mainstream of
European integration processes, respectively Euro-
Atlantic associations: Slovenia was invited to join
NATO at the Prague Summit in November 2002, and
the Copenhagen summit will issue an invitation to
Hungary to join the ED. The enlargement of the
European Union and NATO represents for Croatia
the most important international process. One of the
most important goals of Croatia is to approach both
integrations, since it "fully shares and supports the
values upon which EU and NATO are based". Since
its inception, these structures were the guarantee of
peace, stability, social development, human rights
and economic growth. As far as Croatia is concerned,
membership in the EU and NATO gives a "unique
historical chance to keep and strengthen democracy
and to preserve independence".
Despite the evident progress, there arc still
many challenges, such as the threat of spill-over of
local and regional crises, the phenomenon of
globalisation which generates new security chal-
lenges, proliferation of mass destruction weapons,
bacteriological and biological, refugee crises, organ-
ized international crime, ethnic conflicts - are among
the most important. Terrorism as a global threat un-
derlines the principle of indivisible security. Croatia
as such supports the efforts and goals of the Interna-
tional Antiterrorist Coalition, led by the USA.
The security position of Croatia is also deter-
mined by its multi-regional appurtenance. The inte-
gration within the EU is a unique chance to over-
come all consequences of the war, and the signing of
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the Stabilization and Association Agreement with
the EU opens up a unique space for cooperation and
security. This is also achieved by the entering of
Croatia into the Partnership for Peace Program for
the adaptation of the whole system to the highest
western values. Last but not least is the fact that
Croatia belongs to three European areas with a rec-
ognizable identity - to Central Europe, to South-East
Europe and to the Mediterranean (here the geo-
graphic term "Balkans" is avoided on purpose, since
the "Balkans" was interpreted by the nationalist as a
place of lower civilization, to whom we do not want
to belong).
The Second Chapter ofthe National Security
Strategy lists the values and interests of the Repub-
lic of Croatia. They are, namely: national interests
deriving from the highest values determined by the
Constitution, such as freedom, equality, national (eth-
nic) equality, equality of sexes, peacefulness, social
justice, justice, inviolability of private property, the
protection of nature and the environment, the rule of
law and democracy. Vital interest, on the other hand,
is defined as the survival of sovereign, independent
and territorially integrated state with its national (eth-
nic) identity and basic values. Other interests are
listed as: the survival and development of democ-
racy and democratic institutions, economic prosper-
ity and social justice (redundant!). Democratic val-
ues such as freedom, human and minority rights and
equality are integral part of these interests.
The Third Chapter lists the challenges, risks
and threats to the Republic of Croatia. The danger
ofa military threat in the region has been diminished,
but not eliminated completely. The eventuality of an
inter-state military conflict has been reduced, but still
low- intensity conflict can be possible in the region.
One risk comes out from the general instability in
other world regions, and from situations that may
arise connected with countries that dispose of natu-
ral resources. Transitional problems are also possi-
ble in neighbouring countries, i.e. instability and in-
ternal crises, as well as transitional problems arising
from the internal development of Croatia itself. Pur-
thennore, there are problems in the functioning jus-
tice, corruption, negative demographic processes,
unemployment, protection of minorities, border prob-
lems, transnational challenges, etc. All these risk
factors are matched by the threat of natural and tech-
nological catastrophes, environmental catastrophes,
pollution, diseases, as well as negative outcomes of
the globalisation process, the gap between North and
South, threats to the information science technology
- all these are listed in the Document.
The possibility of military threats within the
region are significantly reduced, but not eliminated
completely. As already mentioned, the chance of an
inter-state military conflict is reduced to minimum,
but chances of low-intensity conflicts in determined
areas in the region are not yet excluded. These areas
might be, as we interpret them, mostly border areas,
as well as areas in which national minorities live.
This is not said explicitly, but is deduced by the con-
text. The geo-political position of Croatia is particu-
larly sensitive. Crises in its immediate neighbour-
hood can have a negative influence on the security
situation in Croatia, but crises in its wider surround-
ing may have a negative impact, too. This "wider
area" is identified as the South MediterraneanlNorth
Africa, the Middle East as well as the Caucasus.
These areas are destabilized by crises, conflicts, high
demographic growth and the diminishing of acces-
sible resources such as water and energy, and are
marked by growing trans-national threats and the spill
over of the crises towards the European continent.
The Republic of Croatia is situated in an area that
connects Europe with the energetic sources on the
territory of Asia (namely the Caucasus and Central
Asia), on the communications that link the devel-
oped countries of Western Europe with industrially
underdeveloped territory of Eastern Europe, albeit
rich in resources, and it lies on the crossroads oftraf-
fie lines by which Central Europe is connected with
the Mediterranean area and with South-Eastern Eu-
rope. Possible conflicts of interests in controlling the
transit-lines of access to new resources or the ambi-
tion to gain influence over the areas of these resources
can generate wider regional crises, that could threaten
also the security and stability of the Republic of
Croatia, as it is stated in the Document. However,
this approach is clearly formulated under the influ-
ence of the balance-of-power theories and dominance
of geo-political theories that claim the importance
of the area in which Croatia is situated, putting in
the background the interdependence of the European
continent within the new architecture of an overall
economic, political, and social cooperation within
the framework either of the EU or the NATO, as well
as other overarching initiatives such as CEFTA, the
Stability Pact, the CEI (Central- European Initiative),
SEECI, etc.
Another potential destabilization threat derives
from the very nature of many societies in the closer
neighbourhood: they might be summarized as "tran-
sition problems" of Southeast European societies.
The economic, political and social transition towards
parliamentary democracy and a market economy is
a complex process with many roadblocks and set-
backs. Malfunction of the state apparatus, worsen-
ing of the social circumstances, fall of the standard
of living, conflicts both of political and social na-
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ture, growing unemployment, rampant corruption and
organized criminal - all these might lead to internal
destabilization of these transition countries and
changes in politics, which might assume, as the Strat-
egy states, "different forms of inter-state revanchism",
and thus lead to inter-state conflicts. The problems
and difficulties of these transition countries represent
security risks for the whole region. The wording is
vague, but the real meaning of these is that internal
contradictions in the transition process might gener-
ate, or regenerate, destructive powers such as nation-
alism, populism and authoritarianism. The conse-
quences of the above mentioned logic are not drawn
in their final implications, since Croatian policy-mak-
ers' even after the fall of the nationalist-authoritarian
regime that emerged from the conflict and the war,
try to avoid mentioning all these "evils" in order to
avoid internal disputes and confrontations (which is
a mistake, in my opinion, because the same threat, or
danger of a relapse can be applicable to Croatia, too).
However, internal evolutions and involutions
are not excluded in assessing the security risks and
threats: they are listed as consequences of negative
manifestations of the transition process in Croatia.
Malfunctioning of the economic system, corruption,
negative demographic development (yet this is a fac-
tor that should not be mixed with others, since it be-
longs to another set of phenomena), decreasing of
the number of working-active population, high un-
employment rate, etc. These "objectively derived
factors" are matched by problems in functioning of
the judiciary and slow administration of justice, that
undermine the confidence of citizens in the function-
ing of the state and the rule of law.
An important role is assigned to ethnic minori-
ties in the region: the right and protection of minori-
ties, if they are solved one-sidedly, might provoke
conflicts among states, that could directly affect the
security of the Republic of Croatia. Obviously, the
question of ethnic minorities will be an important
factor of stabilization or destabilization of the region.
"One-sidedness" is mentioned as a negative approach:
but this is just the approach that Croatia applied to
the solution of minority problems in Croatia, when
in spring 2002 the government dismissed the work-
ing group that formulated the Constitutional Law on
human rights and rights of national minorities, con-
sisting of the most competent Croatian experts in the
field and representatives of minorities themselves,
substituting it by a working group that formulated a
restrictive draft, whom the representatives of the na-
tional minorities expressed their discontent with. No
need to say that advices from the OSCE and other
international fora were neglected, thus in fact achiev-
ing the "one-sidedness" that is deprecated, expressis
verbis, in the National Security Strategy of Croatia.
Border questions that emerged as the conse-
quence of the collapse of Yugoslavia are viewed as a
potential source of instability, but besides considering
them as a risk, the Republic of Croatia at the same
time considers them as a challenge. If Croatia solves
that problem it can contribute in a substantial way to
regional stability. As a matter of fact, Croatia signed
the agreement on the borders only with Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Establishing the borders has been a prob-
lem both with Slovenia and Yugoslavia. The problem
with Slovenia arouse from Slovenia's aspiration to con-
trol the Bay of Piran and to gain access to the open sea
through a corridor. An accord was negotiated last year
and even initialised, by which Slovenia recognized ter-
ritories disputed on the land to Croatia, and from its
side Croatia recognized the border on the sea dividing
the Bay of Piran according to a ratio 2: 1 for Slovenia
(two-thirds versus one-third) as well as acknowledged
a corridor on its part of the national sea as a Slovenian
sea territory. However, Croatian Government revoked
its signing, thus bringing back instability on the two
borders, refusing to negotiate the border agreement
unless Slovenia changes its claims and invoking an
international arbitrage.
On the other side, the border with Serbia is
undefined due to the pockets of territories that ap-
peared on the left sides of the river Danube, due to
the change of the course of the river, that Croatia
claim; the same is for the Prevlaka isthmus, which is
to be also negotiated with a future Montenegro Gov-
ernment, after the EU mediated solution of the drive
to independence of Montenegro.
Other security challenges are identified as the
intensification of "transnational threats" such as glo-
bal terrorism, organized crime, refugee crises - that
will influence directly and indirectly the national se-
curity of Croatia. Global terrorism represents a threat
to international peace and security, which is automati-
cally a threat to Croatia and a threat to Croatian inter-
ests. Organized crime and its consequences, such as
destabilization of state institutions, violation of the
legal order, economic crime and corruption are also
great risks for Croatia. Illegal traffic of weapons,
drugs, illegal migration and human trade, especially
women and children, are also to be listed as major
security risks given the geographical position of
Croatia on the routes that come from Asia, Africa
and Eastern Europe heading towards Western Europe.
Such phenomena might trigger a negative impact on
the state organs and institutions in Croatia and on
economic subjects, causing the growth of criminal
activities, the intensification of organized crime and
terrorism (killings and violent crimes), and that might
bring about, eventually, the threatening to the politi-
cal, legal and economic system of Croatia, and act as
a catalyst, as it is said in the Document, "for the ap-
pearance and spreading of racism, xenophobia and
other negative social processes".
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Other threats to security belong to the area of
natural catastrophes. A special threat is represented
by wood-fires, taking into consideration the climate
and draught on the seacoast during summer. Techno-
logical catastrophes that can affect not only the terri-
tory of Croatia, but also neighbouring countries, may
be caused by out-dated industries in the country as
well as in its surrounding (neighbouring countries),
by environmental pollution caused by old industrial
units. Infectious diseases and epidemics are also
among the natural risks and threats that are not to be
excluded. However, Croatia also lists as a risk one of
the consequences of the last war, such as land mines
and explosive devices that have not yet been neutral-
ized.
New threats and risks, especially in the field
of technological innovations such as computer crime
and strikes to the information systems, can come not
only from abroad, but also in the form of abuse of
private data of Croatian users either by the state bod-
ies and institutions of the Republic of Croatia or by
private organizations.
The Document quotes the negative conse-
quences of globalization: the rising "global gap" be-
tween rich and poor countries, alongside with the po-
litical consequences of such inequalities, could exert
a negative impact on the economic interests and the
development of Croatia. The Strategy quotes that it
is possible "to expect pressure on the Republic of
Croatia in order to impose solutions that would not
be in the interest of Croatian economy or would
threaten other Croatian interests and goals". It is not,
however, specified what kind of this "imposition"
could be, while it can be assumed that any foreign
investment venture might harm the economic inter-
ests of Croatia, let us say, hypothetically, by the very
fact of the re-export of profits abroad. This wording
is not clear enough and can be misguiding, leading to
ambiguities that depend on the interpretation.
3. The "Security Concept"
The "Security Concept", worked out in Chap-
ter IV, defines the basic goal of the function of na-
tional security, as the realization, protection and ad-
vancement of national interests in the circumstances
of existing and expected security challenges, risks and
threats. Methodologically, the Security Concept is
presented by defining the security goals of the Re-
public of Croatia, and principles that encompass meas-
ures and instruments of the so called "security policy".
The "security goals" are the elaboration of the
"general security goal", defined as the building of
preconditions and prerequisites for a free, just and
stable political, economic and social development of
the Croatian society, in cooperation and combined
with other democratic states.
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Those goals, in turn, are the following:
Firstly, the establishment and implementation
of policies and measures, activities and institutions
in the field of security, appropriate in content to the
demands for successful overcoming of actual and
future security risks and threats to the Republic of
Croatia;
Secondly, the building of a positive intema-
tional security environment on the regional and glo-
bal level through participation in international secu-
rity integration processes and forms and cooperation
with other democratic countries;
Thirdly, the development of a stable and eco-
nomically progressive society which will be able on
a long term to build and maintain efficient security
mechanisms and resources, and react successfully to
security challenges, risks and threats.
The principles of the implementation of national se-
curity, on the other hand, are posed as basic concep-
tual frameworks of the organization and action of ap-
propriate institutions of the national security, and they
are meant to represent the general criteria for the
evaluation of results in the sphere of national secu-
rity. They are named as follows:
1. The principle of complexity and multi-
componentiality;
2. The principle of conceptual and legal order-
ing of the field of national security;
3. The principle of integral management and
oversight of the functions of national security (i.e.
democratic control exerted by the Parliament, the
President of the Republic and the Government of the
Republic of Croatia, etc.);
4. The principle of active involvement and ef-
ficient participation in international efforts to build a
suitable security environment;
5. The principle of "healthy and equal-rights
partnership" as the basis for Croatia's approach to
other countries
6. The principle of regional orientation of se-
curity activities.
For the sake of extending security cooperation
to other countries in the region, two principles are
here important and stimulating. The National Secu-
rity Strategy, as we have seen, mentions the "princi-
ple of active involvement and efficient participation
to build a suitable security environment". This prin-
ciple is the result, as elaborated further on, of Croatia's
conception of national security as variable that
presents the result of internal power and stability of
the state and stability and progress of the international
community. In actual conditions, security is conceived
as being indivisible - states and peoples are mutually
dependent in security and oriented towards each other.
This fact is a precondition for the common, coopera-
tive approach of states, their mutual respect, reach-
ing agreement and mutual strengthening of different
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organizational mechanisms and participants, the ori-
entation towards preventive action in the field of se-
curity, and common determination of long-term ac-
tion-strategies. A stable and secure international en-
vironment, as an interest of the Republic of Croatia,
does not create itself, neither the Republic of Croatia
wants to be only a passive recipient of the advan-
tages of such environment that might be created by
the activity of other states. The policy makers, au-
thors of this document express their "sense of respon-
sibility and duty to contribute actively to the construc-
tion of such conditions, in conformity with the ob-
jective possibilities and resources at disposal, and in
those organizational forms in which a qualitative con-
tribution can be given".
The principle of the regional orientation of se-
curity activities also needs to be treated as a positive
innovation: it comes out of the fact that the Republic
of Croatia perceives itself as a small country, and that
the security problems of the contemporary world are
numerous and complex. Therefore, while it supports
in principle the global approach and involvement in
international security activities, it stresses the impor-
tance of Croatia's involvement within the framework
of the region in which it is situated. Security chal-
lenges and threats in that region, irrespectively of their
dimensions are of a greater importance for the na-
tional security of the republic of Croatia than regional
challenges and threats in other parts of the world.
The areas and instruments ofthe security policy
of the Republic of Croatia, another step in implement-
ing the Security Strategy, are listed as follows:
I. Integration with NATO as one of the main
goals of Croatian foreign and security policies. The
strategic concept of NATO, as adopted at the Wash-
ington Summit in 1999, represents for Croatia a se-
curity platform that it fully accepts. NATO's value
lies not only in security guarantees in case of an armed
aggression, but in the systems of values Croatia be-
longs to and wants to develop itself in conformity
with. Therefore joining NATO is Croatia's mid-term
goal, to which all available resources will be subju-
gated. The common values that Croatia recognizes
as its own are democracy, human freedoms and the
rule of law. An intensive process of harmonization
with NATO standard is in course, both political and
technical, to which Croatia wants to abide in order to
join the Alliance. Croatia was accepted in the Part-
nership of Peace, in Spring 2000, and lately, in Spring
2002, in the Membership for Action Plan
2. The integration of Croatia within the Euro-
pean Union is the most important and most complex
endeavour Croatia is facing. A special aspect of this
integration is the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), as an integral part of the EU Com-
mon Security and Foreign Policy. (CSFP). Croatia
will harmonize its foreign and security policy with
the EU in all major global, European and regional
character.
3. Good relations with neighbours and regional
cooperation are the fundamental premises and politi-
cal precondition of a complete Croatian integration
within the European mainstream. Without peace and
security in Croatia's closest environment an optimal
level of national security of Croatia cannot be
achieved. States in the closest environment are, in
principle, classified in three categories: First, well
developed liberal democracies, members of the EU
(Italy and Austria, although Austria does not have a
border with Croatia); Secondly, states in the higher
stage of transition, just before joining the EU, i.e.
NATO (Slovenia and Hungary); Thirdly, states fac-
ing the beginning of the transition process, with in-
herited security and economic-social problems and
under the intensive monitoring of the international
community (Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the Strategy
neither of these states that represent the "closest
Croatian environment" represents a security threat for
the Republic of Croatia,. However, some processes
and situations in some countries represent a "deter-
minate security risk for Croatia". Namely, relations
with Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last decade exerted
a direct influence on national security in Croatia, be-
cause of its geographical location and because of the
fact that Croats are one of the three constituent na-
tions in that country, and therefore Croatia's interest
is that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a stable and
democratic country, capable of a self-sustainable de-
velopment and integrated, as soon as possible, in the
"European mainstream" (not mentioning the wrong-
doing towards Bosnia from Croatian side, during the
last decade, i.e. from the ambition to partition Bosnia-
Herzegovina to the Croato-Bosniac war). Having this
in mind, Croatia declares that it will continue with
the policy of active support of Bosnia- Herzegovina's
central authorities, by maintaining a constant dialogue
with the representatives of the executive and legisla-
tive power in the neighbouring country. Special at-
tention will be paid to the Inter-state Council for co-
operation set up by Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The care for the members of the
Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be
achieved transparently, on a programmatic base. The
return of refugees is the basic assumption of a full-
scale normalization of inter-state relations. Despite
the progress made, this process is still slow and
misbalanced, with an imbalance between the entities.
The Republic Srpska has, especially, a restrictive prac-
tice in this respect, i.e. the return of Croats and
Bosniacs. Croatia will, "fully aware of its responsi-
bility for the regional stability and security, continue
with its policy of non-discrimination on whatsoever
basis, regarding the return and the return of proper-
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ties" (however, it does not acknowledge the admin-
istrative impediments its authorities create to
returnees, as stated in OSCE report for the year 2001).
The document states that an important element of the
security policy of the Republic of Croatia, regarding
Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the cooperation in the field
of border-control, and, even more generally, full co-
operation in home affairs. Croatia acknowledges the
obligation to stimulate cooperation of the competent
bodies of the two states, with the aim to prevent and
eliminate asymmetric challenges and threats - such
as terrorism, organized crime and illegal migrations.
Such cooperation should be, in the following years,
the biggest joint contribution to regional and Euro-
pean security and stability.
The Strategy acknowledges that a turning point
in the relations between Croatia and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia occurred after the parliamen-
tary elections in Yugoslavia in October 2000. This
event led to the full normalization of relations, and,
as it is said - "consequently to the establishment of
good-neighbourhood relations". By opening the proc-
ess of extradition of most responsible perpetrators of
war crimes committed during the aggression on
Croatia to the Hague Tribunal, an important step was
done. The processing of other indictees before the
courts will remove one of the biggest obstacles for
the establishment of "really good neighbourhood re-
lations and full confidence between the two states".
The establishment of the fate of disappeared and de-
tained persons during the war aggression is an "issue
of utmost importance and has an absolute priority".
Among other questions important for the establish-
ment of good neighbourhood relations the return of
refugees and definitive demarcation of the border,
such as the resolving of the security question of
"Croatian Prevlaka" are mentioned explicitly. This
last question, as an important security question, will
be sought to be resolved in "good faith" and in mu-
tual long-time advantage. The document concludes
the formulation of the paragraph on relations between
the FRY and Croatia with the following wording:
"Only by solving the remaining open questions in
good faith preconditions will be created for a long-
term good neighbourhood cooperation and full in-
volvement of all the national resources on both sides
- in the first place economic, and then security, cul-
tural and other. Having in mind this goal, it is of ex-
treme importance to regulate with bilateral state agree-
ments all fields of cooperation, for which a mutual
interest exists".
Here we have to make a remark: although this
formulation in principle holds, and we all could not
but agree with it, in practice it is the Croatian side
that is slowing down both the normalization, as well
as the expansion of the cooperation. The Yugoslav
government proposed to easen the visa regime, but
Croatia refused. The return of the refugees to Croatia
is slow and many impediments and obstacles are cre-
ated, if not by the central authorities, then by the lo-
cal authorities that sabotages the plan of return. A
special case is the reinstatement of "tenants rights"
that Croatia in principle refuses to acknowledge.
Moreover, the bringing before courts of perpetrators
of war crimes and human rights violations is also a
problem in Croatia: due to partisan behaviour of so
called "independent judges", witnesses from Serbia
that could testify are formally invited, but practically
discouraged to come and testify, while judges refuse
to go to Serbia and organize a hearing there (the ex-
ception is the case of the process against the "Gospic
group" that deliberately killed Serbian civilians in
Gospic during the war). Croatian authorities are also
reluctant to act energetically in handing over the in-
dicted officers of the Croatian Army to The Hague
(e.g. the case of the fugitive Gen. Gotovina, and the
case of Gen. Bobetko, that caused even a series of
serious admonishments to Croatian authorities and
seriously affected Croatian international prestige and
standing in the EU).
As other areas and instruments of the Security
Policy of the Republic of Croatia, the document lists
the following: cooperation with international organi-
zations, Control of Weapons and Confidence and Se-
curity Building Measures, Contribution to Interna-
tional Peace and Humanitarian Operations, Develop-
ment of Defence Capabilities, and Internal Security
of the Republic of Croatia.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that Croatia in prin-
ciple accepted the approach to "cooperative security",
but in practice it does not carry out the principles enu-
merated and listed in the National Security Strategy.
For these reasons, Security Cooperation is needed,
that would involve a multi-lateral evaluation of secu-
rity challenges, risks and threats in the region. This
process has to start simultaneously on various levels
of the society: first, it should be promoted by the in-
ternational community: the first segment to be in-
volved can be academics and researchers in independ-
ent and semi-independent (government controlled)
research centres, universities, institutes, think-tanks,
as well as journalists and writers. They can discuss
openly and freely, without any bias, all the aspects of
the security cooperation and generate ideas and ini-
tiatives.
However, this process should take place also
on other levels: parliamentarians, mostly members of
the National Security Committees of the Parliament,
should be dragged into the debate. Military person-
nel should also partake in brainstorming sessions that
would elaborate new initiatives and discuss existing
r
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strategies or strategic documents.
The third level should involve officials from
the executive, in order to create common platforms
for security cooperation. I n the meantime, joint pub-
lications should be published and a wider debate
should be encouraged by the media.
It is obvious that the concept of security im-
plied in this process cannot be a narrowly reduced
concept of security as the absence of threats and risks.
A new approach should be elaborated, taking into
account the most advanced approach of "human se-
curity" (Canadian school on international relations).
That concept should be worked out as a "cooperative
security approach", i.e. a multi-faceted security that
does not comprise only the classical repertoire of se-
curity goals, instruments and technologies, but encom-
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passes the "positive building of security" by centering
on human security issues, such as the circulation of
men, ideas and values - and not only in the security
sector, but in all fields of regional cooperation.
Obviously, this might be only an arduous en-
deavour - and therefore it has to be prepared care-
fully, step-by-step, and should not be discouraged by
initial failure. The biases, stereotypes, and mutual
non-confidence and suspicion are very much alive.
The most visible protagonists of nationalism disap-
peared from the scene, but the virus of nationalism
has not yet been defeated. This requires a long-last-
ing effort and a very slow, but steady strategy: it can
be achieved only with the mediation of the interna-
tional community. •
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